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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ALLISON CYCHOSZ*

"[A] country without a patent office and good patent laws [is]
just a crab, and can't travel any way but sideways or backways."
Mark Twain'
At a time when international patent law harmonization is at
the forefront of international trade discussions, it is necessary to
recognize not only the need for harmonization, but also the great
need for international patent law enforcement.
While
harmonization has continued, the progress of international patent
law enforcement has taken a backseat. Patent laws are useless
without effective enforcement mechanisms.
Until sufficient
enforcement measures are adopted, patent holders will continue to
see unchecked abuses against their valid patents.
This article focuses on the need for stronger enforcement of
intellectual property ("I') rights at the international level,
particularly on biotechnology patents and the current Human
Genome Project ("HGP"). Part I of this article examines the
development of the HGP and international patent law. Part II
considers whether the current international enforcement
mechanisms have been effective in protecting IP rights. Finally,
Part III proposes changes to the current system to create stronger
patent enforcement.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND PATENT
RIGHTS.

A. History of the Human Genome Project
The HGP was created in response to the influx of new

* Allison received her J.D. from John Marshall in 2003. I would like to
thank my husband, Brian Bosley, for his love and for always standing by me
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technologies that emerged in the 1980s. 2 The National Institute of
Health ("NIH") and the Department of Energy ("DOE") initiated
the HGP in the United States ("U.S.") in 1988. 3 The project was
originally estimated to span up to fifteen years and cost three
4
billion dollars.
The HGP is an international effort to map the entire human
genome sequence. 5 It started as a publicly funded, non-profit
effort to create a public database of the 100,000 human genes to
6
enable scientists all around the world to advance their research.
With each gene in the entire sequence identified, scientists would
no longer have to search for the proverbial needle in a haystack
when researching a particular disease.7 With the identification of
2. Ari Patrinos & Daniel Drell, Introducing the Human Genome Project:
Its
Relevance,
Triumphs
and
Challenges,
at
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/

Human_Genome/publicat/judges/drell.html,
5 (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan, Origins of the Human Genome Project, at
http://www.fplc.edu/
risk/vol5/spring/cookdeeg.htm,
9-15 (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
The
government wanted to help the scientific community while also considering
the potential for creation of jobs and wealth through technology. Id.
6.
3. Amy E. Carroll, Comment, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United
States Court of Appeals For the FederalCircuit: Comment: Not Always the Best
Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U.
L. REv. 2433, 2434-35 (1995); Cf. Tim Symanietz, Ethics, Business and the
Human
Genome
Project,
at
http://www.ndsu.nodak.edu/instruct/mcclean/plsc431/students99/symanietz.ht
m, 1 (1999) (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (stating the HGP began in 1990). The
NIH and DOE have several major goals including,
identify[ing] all the estimated 100,000 genes in the human genome[,]
[m]ap[ping] the three billion chemical bases that make up human
DNA[,] [s]tor[ing] this mapped information in databases worldwide[,]
[d]evelop[ing] even better tools for sequencing and analysis[,] [and]
[a]ddress[ing] the many ethical, legal and social issues that come with
this project.
Id.
4. Symanietz, supra note 3.
5. Clare Saliba, Cracking the Code (Apr. 6, 2000), at http://users.rcn.coni
clarems/News/about031800.htm. (last visited Apr. 2, 2004).
The Human
Genome Project was the intellectual "baby" of the United States and the
United Kingdom. Id. It was an international effort to map and sequence the
entire genome consisting of 3 billion letters and 100,000 genes making up the
human genetic code. Id.
6. Id.
7. Symanietz & Drell, supra note 3, 2. All humans have genomes, which
are the genetic instructions located on the twenty-three pairs of chromosomes
in our bodies. Patrinos, supra note 2,
6. These chromosomes are 99.9%
identical from one person to another. Id. The DNA molecules are made up of
four parts, or building blocks, adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine. Id.
These four building blocks pair up, forming the DNA double helix. Id. Each
human cell contains approximately six billion pairs, "three billion from each
parent." Id. However, it is estimated that merely one out of every thousand
base pairs makes us different from each other. Id. "[Wihat we share dwarfs
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the responsible genes, scientists have begun research to counteract
and cure many diseases. 8 The HGP has resulted in a better
understanding of the human genetic make-up, and has advanced
the potential for drug discovery and development. 9
In the U.S., the HGP was initially funded by the federal
government, but in 1992 funding began to shift from government
funded research facilities to privately funded institutes supported
by private investments and public stock offerings. 10 In order for
the shift from public to private funding to occur, private investors
needed a way to recoup their investments in the project.'1
Research companies could not be expected to pour out enormous
amounts of cash without some assurances of return. 12 As a result,
what distinguishes us." Id.
8. Patrinos & Drell, supra note 2,
13-15. The HGP will allow scientists
to identify the complete human DNA sequence so that scientists would "no
longer have to do a needle in the haystack type of search for small genes[."
Symanietz, supra note 3,
2. Another benefit of having the entire DNA
sequence predetermined is enabling scientists to more effectively perform
further research on the importance of the seemingly unimportant DNA
contained in every human, i.e. the repeated DNA and the non-protein
encoding DNA. Id. See Carl F. Cranor, Are Genes Us?, (1994) (discussing
benefits of genetic mapping). For example, the gene found on chromosome
four is responsible for Huntington's disease. Id. at 27. Chromosome nineteen
has already been identified as contributing to the genetic defect of myotonic
dystophy as well as the aberrant triplet repeats which are known to be present
at the onset "of at least nine diseases, including Huntington's disease."
Patrinos & Drell, supra note 2,
13. Chromosome sixteen genes have been
identified as contributing to "Batten's disease, polycystic kidney disease,
Crohn's disease, forms of breast and prostate cancer and Fanconi's anemia, as
well as many others." Id. In addition, "the DNA repair genes HHR23A,
XRCC1 and ERCC2 as well as genes involved in olfactory receptors,
Alzheimer's disease and one form of migraine headache have been discovered
on chromosome 19." Id.
9. Patrinos & Drell, supra note 2,
10. The goal of the HGP is to
document the entire sequence of human DNA, as well as to provide the
necessary information to spearhead research to begin to understand what
makes us individuals. Id. 7. The HGP will also provide critical information
to begin to understand the origins of diseases. Id. These discoveries will
contribute to the research being done in the fields of biology and
biotechnology, opening the door to new treatments for diseases. Id.
10. Cook-Deegan, supra note 2,
27-29, 36. By the end of 1993, private
investors contributed over $100 million to the project. Id. at 36.
11. Timothy Linkkila & Timothy Tracy, Biotechnology Process Patents: Is
Special
Legislation
Needed?,
at
http://www.fplc.edu/risk/
vol5/spring/lin&trac.htm,
1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2004). The field of
biotechnology is still relatively young. Id. 2. It has been estimated that the
cost of discovering a new drug and bringing it to market, on average, exceeds
$359 million. Id.
12. Gerald Mossinghoff, Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/progress.htm,
2-3 (lastvisited
Jan. 29, 2003). The amount of investment capital necessary for research and
development to introduce a useful, effective pharmaceutical drug is
astounding. The cost of developing a new drug, on average, can exceed $500
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patent protection has become the essential tool to ensure economic
and scientific success for pharmaceuticals.
.

IB.

History of Patents in the U.S.
13
Patent protection in the U.S. begins with the Constitution.
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution states: "Congress shall have
the power... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors, the
exclusive Right to their' respective Writings and Discoveries."14 A
patent is an exclusive government grant used to encourage
investment in research and development.' 5 A holder of a patent
has the right to exclude others and exploit the fruits of his labor
until the patent expires; in return, the government then makes
public the information or the invention.' 6 This disclosure ignites
inventive activity, for others to build upon the work of the patent
holder.' 7 Without patents, companies would have a difficult time
recouping their investments and would be discouraged from
8
making public their new found knowledge and inventions.'
In 1980, Chief Justice Burger handed down a decision which
held the door wide open for patents.' 9 In his discussion Burger
million. Id. 1 2. These astounding figures are rarely, if ever, seen in any other
field where the cost of discovery and development is so high, and the cost to
reverse engineer a product is so low. Id. 3.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. Id.
15. Thomas G. Field Jr., Intellectual Property: The Practical and Legal
Fundamentals, at www.fplc.edu/tfield/plfip.htm, III Al (last visited Jan. 29,
2004). There are three kinds of patents in the U.S.-utility, design and plant.
Id. at III A2. Utility patents include "machines, industrial processes,
compositions of matter and articles of manufacture." Id. "Design patents
protect ornamental features, rather than the function, of articles such as
containers or light fixtures." Id. "Plant patents reward discovery of
previously uncultivated plants or the breeding of novel plants." Id. See also
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: The WTO TRIPS Agreement, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/ipr/ipr-wtotrips.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2004) [hereinafter Protection of InternationalProperty Rights] (discussing the
benefits of patent protection): Strong patent protection is the cornerstone of
attracting corporate investment. Id. Patent protection rewards innovation;
promotes the discovery of more cost efficient production methods; encourages
the discovery of new products and technology; stimulates local, as well as
national, economies; creates jobs, and encourages the discovery of information
which could potentially benefit the entire human race. Id.
16. Field, supra note 15, at III A3-4.
17. Id. Patents encourage investment and competitiveness. Id.
18. Lila Feisee, Anything Under the Sun Made By Man, (Apr. 11, 2001) at
www.bio.org/news/041101.html. The biotech industry spends an exorbitant
amount of capital to fund research and development, more than any other
industry. Id. Therefore, it is even more prevalent within the biotech industry
to facilitate the use of patents to recover the enormous investments required
to develop a pharmaceutical. Id.
19. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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declared, "[e]verything under the sun is patentable."20 In response
to this landmark decision, Congress enacted laws to expand patent
protection. 2 1
Despite the vast opportunity to patent new
inventions, there are still several requirements before a patent

application is granted.
C.
There

granted. 22

General Requirements for a Patent Grant

are several requirements before

a

patent will be

In order for an applicant to be issued a patent, the

subject matter must be new, useful, and nonobvious. 23
The
novelty requirement is the easiest to overcome, 24 and merely
20. Id. at 309. See also Jennifer Van Brunt, Next Move In the Patent Game,
Signals Magazine, (April 4, 2001) available at http://www.signalsmag.com/
signalsmag.nsf/0/5BFFOC004DB8303F88256A390080AA36?Open (stating that
before Diamond v. Chakrabarty,the Supreme Court was hostile toward patent
claims until 1952, when Congress revised and codified the law). With the new
changes, patent holders did not do well in court leading to doubts about the
benefits of patents and, in turn, levels of U.S. innovation declined. Id. In the
late 1970s, trade imbalances led President Carter and Congress to seek
stronger protection, which led to the creation of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit ("CAFC") in 1982. Id. The CAFC has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction for patent cases and is subject to infrequent review by the
Supreme Court. Id. Before Chakrabarty, researchers could patent the use of
an organism, such as those used to create antibiotics; researchers could also
patent the process of creating an antibiotic, such as fermentation, but not the
organism itself. Id.
Chakrabarty was the first decision that allowed the
patenting of a living thing; even today, some countries still do not allow it. Id.
See also Feisee, supra note 18 (recognizing that after Chakrabarty,the biotech
industry skyrocketed). Now there are over 1,300 biotech companies with over
150,000 employees. Id. Directly and indirectly, the biotech industry has
created over half a million jobs and has generated almost $50 billion in
revenues. Id.
21. See Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §
3701 (2000) (making technology transfer an integral part of federal
laboratories). See also Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (giving small
businesses the right to retain title to inventions created using federal funds).
See also The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, §
12(a), 100 Stat. 1785 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701) (authorizing federal
laboratories to cooperate with public and private organizations). See also
Saliba, supra note 5 (explaining that locating a gene is only half the battle).
Simply knowing that a gene exists is not enough; a researcher must identify a
gene and be able to explain a use for that gene. Id. Otherwise, a patent will
not be granted. Id.
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (outlining the oath required by patent
applicants). See also Field, supra note 15 (explaining what is necessary for a
U.S. patent application).
23. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2000). See also id. § 112 (2000) (describing the
requirements for the written description of an invention); id. 35 § 101 (2000)
(describing who may obtain a patent); id. § 100 (2000) (defining an invention).
24. Kate Murashige, Overview of Potential Intellectual Property Protection
for 1iotechnology, at http://www.fplc.edu/risk/vol5/spring/murashig.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003). The novelty requirement is easy for a patent applicant
to overcome since the subject matter merely must not have existed elsewhere
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requires that the subject matter must not have been known or
described in a printed publication somewhere. 25
The utility
requirement simply means that the subject matter must be useful
26
to the general consuming public or the research community.
Finally, for the nonobvious requirement, the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") may deny the grant if the differences
between the applicant's invention and a previous invention are
27
obvious.

D. Benefits of Patents
The main benefits of a patent are twofold. Patents allow a
return on investments made, while at the same time giving the
public access to new data. 28 Often, a company does not profit from
the research and development or from the patent itself, but does
profit from the practical application of resulting discoveries. 29 For
example, by having a limited monopoly on a gene sequence linked
to a disease, such as cancer, a company would have a great
30
advantage to discovering the drugs to combat that disease.

before. Id.
25. See Feisee, supra note 18 (recognizing that an element found in its
natural form cannot be patented). Id. However, if the element changes so
that it is a purified element, or different from that found in nature, then a
patent may be granted. Id.
26. Rebecca Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project:
Problems with Patenting Research Tools, at http://www.piercelaw.edu/
risk/vol5/spring/Eisenber.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2003). See also Murashige,
supra note 24 (explaining that anybody can receive a utility patent for a new
and useful machine or process or the improvement of an existing machine or
process). "Claims of relevance in biotechnology can be directed to proteins,
DNA molecules, cells, mice, antibodies, methods of treatment, methods of
recombinant production, oligosaccharides, oligonucleotides and so forth. They
can also be directed to assay devices, chromatographic columns, methods to
conduct electrophoresis, panels of peptides and methods of diagnosis." Id. See
also Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (holding that "[u]nless
and until a process is refined and developed to this point - where specific
benefit exists in currently available form - there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross [sic] what may prove to be a broad field").
27. Introduction to Understanding Patents, at http://www.lib.umich.edu/
ummu/pattni/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
28. See Eisenberg, supra note 26 (explaining that the reason for granting
patents for research discoveries is to provide the companies, which invest in
the development of pharmaceuticals, with a means of reaping the rewards of
its investments). Patents also provide some protections against free riders
who have not shared in the high costs of the development process. Id.
29. See Cook-Deegan, supra note 2 (showing that the potential for profit lies
not in the patent but in applying the new discoveries for practical uses). The
creation of an effective pharmaceutical is the most effective way of recouping
corporate investment. Id.
30. Symanietz, supra note 3. See also Feisee, supra note 18 (noting thae the
biotech industry has created nearly 100 drugs and vaccines helping more than
270 million people across the globe). Currently, there are another 350 drugs
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Patent protection is critical to recover the tremendous amount of
capital needed for the research and development to bring a
Moreover, it is
pharmaceutical product to the market. 31
imperative that the patent last long enough to allow the biotech
company to recoup its investment.
Intellectual property rights are most prevalent in the
The research and development
pharmaceutical industry. 32
involved in bringing an effective new drug to the market is
astounding. Typically, the pharmaceutical industry investigates
over 15,000 chemical and molecular compounds before discovering
perhaps three which are suitable for human use, and developing
only one which would go on to become a profitable
pharmaceutical .33
In recent years it has become quite obvious that patents have
played a large role in a private research institute's "race to
sequence the human genome."34 The rapid increase in patent
applications evidences this large role of patents. In 1991, the PTO
for sequenced data, and that
received about 4,000 patent requests 35
number increased to 500,000 in 1996.
E. InternationalPatent Controversy
An international controversy sparked in 1991 when the NIH
filed for hundreds of patents on gene sequences. 36 After the PTO
rejected the applications, the NIH abandoned the effort, but the
attempt sparked a world wide controversy. 37 The U.S. became
embroiled in the controversy for three reasons: the U.S. is a leader
of the HGP research, the biotech industry in the U.S. is enormous,
that are in the clinical trial stage and may be ready for release soon. Id.
31. Mossinghoff, supra note 12.
32. Joseph Papovich, Intellectual Property in the TRIPS Era, at
http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0598/ijee/ipustr.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2003). The US began suffering from chronic trade deficits in the 1980s. Id. It
became apparent that these deficits could be alleviated by exporting those
products in which the U.S. has a great comparative advantage. Id. One area
the U.S. has its strongest advantage over other countries is in intellectual
property. Id. It became clear to the U.S. that U.S. intellectual property
exportation was not as high as it should be due to the high rate of counterfeit
U.S. intellectual property in other countries. Id.
33. Africa Shuns US Move Allowing Access to Cheaper AIDS Drugs, (Aug.Sep. 2000) at www.twnside.org.sg/title/twrl20f.htm.
34. Symanietz, supra note 3.
35. Id.
36. Feisee, supra note 18. "[I]n the year 2000, the NIH obtained 120 U.S.
patents, filed 189 applications and executed 185 licenses and 109 cooperative
research and development agreements (known as CRADAS) with the private
sector." Id.
37. Cook-Deegan, supra note 2. This created the race to sequence the
human genome. Id. Each country had to secure a patent to beat the other
researchers in other countries so that it may get credit for and use what they
had discovered. Id.
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38
and the U.S. is well known for its strong patent system.

F.

History of InternationalPatent Law

The discussion of international enforcement of IP rights
started long before the HGP. The first global discussion took place
at the Paris International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property ("Paris Convention") in 1883. 39 The Paris
Convention set forth several provisions for international patent
applications, the first of which was national treatment that
ensures the equal treatment of both domestic and foreign
inventors in the application process. 40 A second provision gives
each applicant in a member country the same filing date for
41
subsequent applications in other member states.
Although the Paris Convention made great steps toward a
global system of patent protection, there was no international body
to enforce these accomplishments. 42 Such an organization was
established over eighty years later with the creation of the World
Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") in 1967. 43 WIPO is
one of sixteen specialized agencies of the U.N. administering
twenty-one international treaties dealing with different aspects of
IP protection. 44 WIPO has the responsibility for receiving an
application once a pharmaceutical company has filed a national
patent, publishing reports regarding what national patents have
been filed as well as initiating patent registration procedures in
45
member countries.
International discussions of IP enforcement have been
ongoing. After five years of debate, the Patent Law Treaty ("PLT')
was adopted on June 1, 2000.46 The PLT is aimed at facilitating
easier and cheaper access to patent protection. 47 Over forty-seven
countries have signed on to the PLT.48 The PLT outlines in greater
38. Carroll, supra note 3, at 2438-39.
39. Id. at 2456.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Robert J. Pechman, Note, Seeking Multilateral Protection for
Intellectual Property: The United States 'TRIPS" Over Special 301, 7 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 179, 181 n.4 (1998) (explaining that the Paris Convention left
the enforcement of IP rights up to each nation).
43. Id. at 180 n.2.
44. Anthony Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to Global Patent Law
Harmonization, 22 N. KY. L. REV. 579, 594-98 (1995). See WIPO, Member
States, at http://www.wipo.int/members/members/index.html (last visited Jan.
30, 2003) (listing the member states). There are 179 signatory states. Id.
45. Carroll, supra note 3, at 2457.
46. Patent Law Treaty, June
1, 2000, at http://www.wipo.int/
clea/docs/en/wo/wo038en.htm. (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
47. Id.
48. PTO Seeks Comments on International Patent Law Harmonization,
Patent,
Trademark
&
Copyright
Law
Daily,
at
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detail the requirements for filing a patent application, however,
the PLT fails to address any enforcement issues with regard to
49
patent infringement.
Other global forums, outside of WIPO, have discussed
enforcing international IP rights.5 0 The discussion surfaced in the
1986 Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs ("GATTF').51 As a result, the Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS") was included in GATT.52
TRIPS required all WTO members to pass and enforce copyright,
patent and trademark laws and provided a dispute settlement
mechanism to protect patent holder's rights. 53 TRIPS allows for a
54
twenty-year term of patent protection from the time of filing.
TRIPS defines patentable subject matter as any new invention,
whether product or process, that involves an inventive step and is
capable of industrial application.5 5 Additionally, TRIPS prohibits
56
discrimination by a member country against foreign patents.
http://subscript.bna.com/SAMPLES/ptd.nsfl (Mar. 22, 2001).
49. Patent Law Treaty, June 1, 2000, at http://www.wipo.int/
clea/docs/en/wo/wo038en.htm. (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). See also Patent
Cooperation Treaty, Sept. 3, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 7645 (making it possible to seek
patent protection for an invention in each member country by filing a single
international patent).
50. Murashige, supra note 24. The European Patent Convention of 1978
was a first step for European nations to harmonize the patent application
process. Id. However, patent rights still had to be enforced in each country
individually. Id.
51. WTO, Trading Into the Future, at http://www.wto.org/englishl
thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/agrm6_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). TRIPS sets
out the minimum rights that member countries must grant patent holders.
Id. Many countries see the guidelines as the only rights which need to be
granted, but the main objective was to set the minimum requirements with
the intention that each country go beyond those requirements to further
protect patent holders. Id. See WTO, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Uruguay Round Agreement, [hereinafter TRIPS], Apr. 15,
1994, at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal e/27-trips_01_e.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003) (laying out the caveats of the agreement).
52. TRIPS, supra note 51. TRIPS became U.S. law in 1994. Id. TRIPS is
an agreement that is part of the World Trade Organization ('VTO"). Id.
53. The Work of the USTR - Intellectual Property, at www.ustr.gov/sectors/
ustrwork.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
54. TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 33.
55. Id. at art. 27. See also id. at art. 28 (defining the rights conferred to a
patent holder); Id. at art. 41 (outlining the general obligation for enforcement
by member countries); Id. at art. 44 (stating when an injunction should be
granted to prevent the importation of goods infringing patent holder's rights);
Id. at art. 64 (outlining the dispute settlement procedure).
56. Id. at art. 41. TRIPS is the most effective multilateral treaty on IP
rights yet. Protection of International Property Rights, supra note 15. It
establishes a set of minimum standards for IP protection, enforces IP rights by
requiring signatory nations to provide national procedures and enforcement
and it provides a binding settlement dispute mechanism for complaints
against WTO members that do not comply. Id.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[37:985

G. TRIPS In Depth
TRIPS took great strides in protecting patent holders' rights.
Yet, TRIPS left some controversial loop holes. Article 31 of TRIPS
allows the use of patent subject matter without the authorization
of the patent holder. This practice is better known as compulsory
licensing. Compulsory licensing is a government issued license for
the product to be produced domestically while providing the patent
57
holder with reasonable compensation.
This is the most controversial article of TRIPS because its
terms are so vague. Article 31, section (b) provides that use of the
subject matter may be had without permission if the party seeking
use has made an attempt to obtain authorization from the patent
holder "on reasonable commercial grounds and that such efforts
have not been successful within a reasonable period of time."5 8
This language has caused much debate since it is impossible to
determine what "reasonable commercial grounds" and "reasonable
period of time" mean. 59 How long does a State need to negotiate
with a patent holder before it can make a determination that
discussions should cease? Is one week, one month, six months, or
one year reasonable? How much compensation should a State
offer a patent holder before it can determine that an agreed upon
price cannot be had? Are what a citizen can afford, what the
government can afford, the cost to make the drug, or the profits
lost to the patent holder reasonable?
Each of these questions are valid, but TRIPS leaves them
unanswered. Section (b) permits the Member State to forego the
"reasonable" provisions of negotiation in the case of a national
emergency, leaving the patent holder merely with the right of
notification that it, in fact, has no rights. 60 Section (f) further
states that such use shall be predominantly for the domestic
market. 61 It does not require that the use be limited solely to the
domestic market.
This has been interpreted to apply to developing countries
that do not have either the technology or resources to manufacture
the drug within its borders. These countries are limited because
TRIPS prevents a developing country from granting a compulsory
license to a foreign manufacturer since this would interfere with a
patent in a foreign country. 62 Therefore, the compulsory license

57. Divya Murthy, Comment, The Future of Compulsory Licensing:
Decipheringthe Doha Declarationon the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
17 AM. U. L. REV. 1299, 1307 (2002).
58. TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 31.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Murthy, supra note 57, at at 1335.
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63
may not be useful in some cases.

H. The Doha Declaration
These issues have thus far culminated in the Doha
Ministerial in November 2002, which resulted in the Declaration
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health ("Declaration").6 4 The
Declaration is a ministerial interpretation of TRIPS. It seeks to
clarify a number of these issues and primarily provides
interpretive meaning to imprecise obligations of TRIPS.
Therefore, it will likely be persuasive authority in future dispute
resolutions under TRIPS.65
1.

Compulsory Licenses

The Declaration opened the door for compulsory licensing of
patented pharmaceuticals.
In pertinent part the Declaration
states,
[e]ach member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes
66
a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
As a result, the Declaration allows the countries to define, on
their own terms, what constitutes a national emergency. The
countries are free to determine the grounds upon which a
compulsory license will be granted and for what purpose.
2.

ForeignProduction

As previously discussed, Article 31 section (f) of TRIPS
prevents a country with a compulsory license from seeking the
manufacture of that drug in a foreign country. Developing nations
sought language in the Declaration that would permit them to do
so since some nations lack the capacity to produce the drugs
67
domestically.
The Declaration was not able to effectively address this issue
and instead deferred it to the Council of TRIPS.
We

recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face

63. Alan Sykes, Public Health and International Law: TRIPS,
Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution," 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 47, 55 (2002).
64. WTO,
The
Doha
Declaration
Explained,
at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/dohaexplained-e.htm
(last visited
Mar. 24, 2004).
65. Id. at 54.
66. See Sykes, supra note 63, at 54 (quoting the Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, adopted November 14, 2001).
67. Id. at 54-55.
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difficulties in making effective use of compulsory licensing under the
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an
expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the General
Council before the end of 2002.68
If compulsory licensing is to be used effectively to combat
epidemics, the countries that do not have manufacturing facilities
should be allowed to obtain the drugs from a foreign country. If
the main goal is to stamp out these diseases, then there should be
no barriers applicable only to the least developed countries, which
coincidentally, are where many epidemic diseases are located.
The one place where TRIPS limits compulsory licensing to
protect patent rights is the one place where it should not be
limited. The purpose of the restriction is to protect patent rights
in foreign countries and to prevent the exportation of cheaper
pharmaceuticals. However, when there is a national emergency
for public health, the least developed countries should not lose the
benefit of compulsory licensing for the "idea" of patent protection.
Patents are infringed upon in so many ways, and compulsory
licensing is not narrowly construed enough to provide patent
holders with any control or certainty as to how it will be used.
This is especially true now that the Declaration allows each
country to determine, without any direction, what constitutes a
national emergency. It seems to be an irrelevant measure to limit
the benefits of compulsory license to those who can manufacture it
domestically, when the main purpose is to combat these epidemics
that are predominant in countries which do not have the
manufacturing capabilities.
I.

Enforcement of Patent Protectionin the U.S. and
Internationally

Even with these effective steps toward globalization of IP
rights, there still remains a major issue with patent enforcement.
TRIPS dispute settlement procedures apply only to WTO memberstates, and they can be time consuming and arduous. 69 Even if the
WTO General Council makes a determination in a case, no
effective enforcement procedures exist to ensure that a member
country will comply. 70
For example, if a U.S. pharmaceutical

68. Id. at 54 (quoting the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, November 14, 2001).
69. See WTO, Trading Into the Future, Large Flow Chart, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tife/disp2e.htm
(last visited
Jan. 29, 2003) (illustrating the steps and the time required to work a claim
through the settlement process).
70. WIPO, TRIPS Agreement Arbitration Procedures, at http://arbiter.
wipo.int/arbitration/procedures/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). TRIPS
allows for mediation or arbitration in its dispute settlement process. Id.
However, only willing parties can be brought before the general council. Id. If
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company has a patent infringement dispute with a company in
Argentina, the U.S. company could not file for a hearing in the
WTO. 71 That company is forced to rely upon the violating country
for protection of its IP rights. 72 Relying upon another country,
even a WTO member country, can prove extremely difficult in
73
enforcing patent rights.
The United States Trade Representative ("USTR") is
empowered by Congress to enforce laws worldwide to control IP
infringement. 74 The USTR uses the Special 301, which is also
known as the Omnibus Trade Act of 1974. 75 The USTR annually
creates a list of countries on its 'Watch List" to warn investors
that their patent rights may not be adequately protected. 76 Free
trade and tariff preferences are used to encourage other countries
77
to provide adequate protection.

a member country refuses to appear there is no alternative. Id. Also, the
mediation process is not enforceable, and a party may abandon the mediation
process if it so chooses. Id. Under the arbitration process, a decision may be
binding upon a member country, however, enforcement mechanisms are
lacking in effect. Id.
71. See TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 50 (stating that Members of TRIPS
shall make settlement procedures available to patent holders, however, patent
holders are not conferred the right to take the matter to the WTO).
72. Harold C. Wegner & Stephen Maebius, The Global Biotech Patent
Application, 666 PLUPAT 87 (2001). In TRIPS transition countries where
enforcement of pharmaceutical patent is nonexistent, such as India, it remains
difficult to stop the infringement of patent rights. Id. at 125-26.
73. Id. at 126. American pharmaceutical companies know all too well how
difficult it was to enforce a patent in Japan. Proving that the use of a research
tool was violating a patent is difficult enough but, often, the lack of
meaningful discovery made the system useless. Id. And even if it was proven,
and the company won in court, the patented material could still be exported
into yet another country. Id. at 127.
74. 19 U.S.C. § 2171 (2000).
75. See Omnibus Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (1974) (creating the
Special 301).
76. Greg Aharonian, Global Intellectual Property Revenue Losses for US
Companies, at http://www.eff.org/IP//iptheftlosses.stats (1998) (last visited
Apr. 1, 2004). The USTR estimated that approximately $1,908,660,000 was
lost in the pharmaceutical market alone due to theft of U.S. company patent
rights. Id. The December 2000 Special 301 report of the USTR identified
several countries that violate intellectual property rights. Id. Among those on
the "Priority Watch List" (those countries who warrant close monitoring to
determine if Special 301 action is needed) is the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Id. The UAE agreed to prevent the marketing of unauthorized copycat drugs
but "unfortunately, marketing approval for some copycat drugs was granted
nevertheless... Argentina has failed to grant exclusive marketing rights for
pharmaceuticals, despite being obliged to do so under the TRIPS Agreement."
Id.
77. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000) (outlining the actions the USTR may take
against a country identified in the Special 301 Report).
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II. THE NEED FOR STRONGER GLOBAL PATENT PROTECTION

A.

The Underminingof InternationalPatents

The international market has been infected with patent
infringement. There are a myriad of ways in which a patent can
be infringed in the international market and a host of countries
78
that permit or even encourage patent infringement.
1.

InternationalPatent Infringement Statistics

Both countries and individual companies suffer extreme
losses from patent infringement. 79 Patent infringement causes
lost sales, distortions in trade flows and diminished capital to fund
new research and development.80 A recent study illuminated the
excessive amount of sales lost to patent infringement. The results
showed that pharmaceuticals pirated in just five countries
amounted to $192 million, while legitimate sales by U.S.
companies were only $162 million. 8' On a global scale, it has been
estimated that over $200 billion a year are lost to pirated IP rights
as a whole.8 2 As evident, pirating is a lucrative black-market
industry.
2.

Methods of InfringingPatent Rights

Patent infringers have no incentive to follow international
law or to protect patent holders rights since there are several
78. See Wegner & Maebius, supra note 72, at 125-29 (discussing the
infringement of patent holder's rights and the difficulty of enforcing IP rights).
79. Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing

Countries: U.S. Efforts To Enforce PharmaceuticalPatents in Thailand, 16
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 569, 575 (1994). The U.S. economy suffers when
IP rights are infringed. Id. at 569. When U.S. patent owners are not
compensated for the use of their patent materials, the U.S. can lose sales,
which creates a decrease in international trade when decreasing the U.S.
foreign trade deficit is crucial. Id. In just seven years, from 1980-1987, the
"U.S. trade deficit increased from $31 billion to $170 billion." Id. at 574. The
yearly payment on the interest on the trade deficit in the 1990's was estimated
to be around $100 billion. Id. at 575. Therefore, enforcing U.S. patent rights
abroad is critically important to the U.S. economy. Id.
80. Angela Beam, Comment, Piracy of American Intellectual Property in
China, 4 D.C.L. J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 335, 336-37 (1995). See also Sabatelli &
Rasser, supra note 44, at 582-91 (discussing the need for global patent
harmonization).
81. Kirchanski, supra note 79, at 575.
82. Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Econ. Policy and Trade of the
U.S. House Int'l Relations Comm., 106th Cong. (October 13, 1999) (statement
of Raymond Kelly, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service). Also, approximately
750,000 jobs are lost annually as well due to theft of IP rights. Id. See also
Carroll, supra note 3, at 2470. One investigation revealed that in 1986, U.S.
businesses lost $23.8 billion due to pirated goods. Id. This estimated loss was
equal to 15% of the U.S. trade deficit. Id.
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methods for getting around current international patent laws.
a.

Parallel Importing

The first method patent infringers use is parallel
importing.8 3 Parallel importing occurs when the patent holder
gives permission to produce a patented good in one country, but it
is then exported into a second country without the patent holder's
permission.8 4 Generally, the patent holder has the right to control
85
the importation of the patented goods into other countries.
Typically, parallel importing occurs when there is a great
disparity in market conditions between two countries.8 6 The
patented goods are generally imported from a country with a lower
87
priced market and into a country with a higher priced market.
The ultimate result is free profits for the patent infringer at the
expense of the patent holder.
The practice of parallel importing is most apparent in the
pharmaceutical industry, which provides necessary medication to
88
the lower market economies at more affordable prices.
Therefore, when these pharmaceuticals are exported, from the
lower to higher market economies, the only party that profits is
the patent infringer.8 9 While the pharmaceutical company is
trying to recoup the cost of its research, the parallel importer is
reaping the profits.
In the U.S. and in the European Union ("E.U."), parallel
importing is considered patent infringement. 90 However, the E.U.
83. See Intellectual Property: Parallel Import of Pharmaceuticals, at
http://www.phrma.org/intnatl/intellprop/parallel.phtml (last visited Nov. 11,
2002) (discussing parallel imports and pharmaceuticals).
84. Id. Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of National
Intellectual Property Norms in International TradingAgreements, 12 AM. U.J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 769, 778-80 (1997) (directing the reader's attention to the
portion of the article entitled "Overview of Main Intellectual Property Treaties
and Conventions").
85. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 84, at 778-80.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. The EU permits parallel importation of goods within its member
countries, allowing the movement of pharmaceuticals from one nation to
another resulting in the parallel importation of pharmaceuticals. Id. For
instance, lower priced pharmaceuticals are purchased in Greece and then
imported to another EU member state for sale at a higher price. Id. As a
result, Greece is experiencing shortages of some medications. Id.
89. Id. The government and its citizens that receive the parallel imports
are at high risk since the conditions in which the pharmaceuticals are stored
and shipped are not controlled and can cause public health concern. Id.
90. Wegner & Maebius, supra note 72, at 114-15. See also, Lee Ann Askew,
Comment, The ECJ, the ICJ and Intellectual Property: Is Harmonization the
Key? 7 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 375, 375-862 (2000) (discussing the E.U. and
the European Court of Justice as well as the U.N. and the International Court
of Justice).
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only prohibits parallel importing into the E.U.91
Member
countries of the E.U. can parallel import within the E.U. and the
patent holder's rights are considered to be exhausted. 92
b.

Exhaustion of Rights

Another method of limiting the rights of patent holders is the
doctrine of exhaustion of rights. 93 The doctrine dictates that once
a patent holder has produced the protected goods, and has entered
them' into the stream of commerce, the patent holder's rights have
been exhausted. 94 The patent holder no longer has the right to
95
prevent the further distribution of that good in the market place.
In effect, the exhaustion of rights limits the control the patent
96
holder has over its own goods.
c.

Free Riding

Yet another method that negates international patent law is
"free riding."97 Free riding is a method of patent infringement by a
nation as well as its citizens. 98 Free riding is the taking of
patented property without paying for its use.99
It is most
prevalent in the pharmaceutical industry where research and
development costs are extreme. 100 Free riding patent infringers
can easily copy the drug and benefit from a windfall profit without
bearing any of the costs of development. 10 1
3. Several Countries Have Been IdentifiedAs Lacking Patent
Enforcement
Several countries are well known for their weak, or even

91. Wegner & Maebius, supra note 72, at 115.
92. Id. at 114.
93. WTO, Parallel Imports, Grey Imports and Exhaustion of Rights, at
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop-e/trips_e/factsheetpharm02-e.htm#paralle
limports (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
94. Hicks, supra note 84, at 810-11.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 607-08 (explaining that many
countries, excluding the US, have an automatic publication requirement
whereby an application for a patent is automatically published about eighteen
months after filing regardless of whether an application was approved or not,
effectively making public the information when the patent applicant may or
may not have any legal protection).
98. Nicolas S. Gikkas, InternationalLicensing of Intellectual Property: The
Promise and the Peril, 1 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 6, 29 (1996). Governments that
allow its citizens to take, use and sell intellectual property without
compensating the owner are considered free riding governments. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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nonexistent, patent laws for pharmaceuticals1o2 In fact, some
countries incorporate patent infringement into their economic
planning. 10 3 Here in the U.S., the Special 301 list is used to create
a list of those countries that violate IP rights.10 4 The Special 301
list has three categories for those countries that deny adequate IP
protection: priority foreign countries, priority watch list and watch
list.105 The priority foreign country watch list identifies countries
"that have the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices
that have the greatest adverse impact" on IP rights.10 6 The
priority watch list identifies "countries whose acts, policies and
practices meet some, but not all, of the criteria for priority foreign

102. Id. at 30. Among those countries are India, Thailand, Brazil and
Taiwan. See also Beam, supra note 80, at 341-49 (explaining the legislative
framework for China's IP rights and discussing the lack of IP rights in China's
legal system due to traditional Chinese culture); William C. Revelos, Patent
Enforcement Difficulties in Japan:Are There Any Satisfactory Solutions for the
United States?, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 503 (1995) (discussing the

recent surge in lawsuits filed in the US against Japanese companies as well as
explaining how the Japanese court system works in comparison to the US
court system). A recent example of the surge of lawsuits is the $127 million
award in a U.S. patent case covering auto focus technology for Honywell
Camera Company against Minolta. Id. at 506. See also Kirchanski, supra
note 79, at 576-82 (discussing the negative consequences of lacking IP
enforcement for developing countries); Industry Policy in Denmark, at
www.dkpto.dkl
publications/reports/indu-policylkap03.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003)
(discussing the IP system and enforcement of IP rights in Denmark and
explaining that almost 20% of the country's enterprises have experienced
trouble with parallel imports, affecting a large portion of that country's trade
and industry); Sabatelli & Rasser supra note 44, at 584-88 (discussing how
national patent rights and international trade principles clash).
103. Gikkas, supra note 98, at 30. These countries include: Taiwan,
Singapore, Hong Kong and Korea. Id.
104. See Pechman, supra note 42, at 196-97 (explaining the view that Special
301 may violate GATT); see also Kirchanski, supra note 79, at 587 (noting that
Special 301 is a provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988 which was intended to provide the USTR with a "credible threat of U.S.
retaliation against any trading partners that fail to reform their intellectual
property laws").
105. 19 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000). See Kirchanski, supra note 79, at 588
(describing the utilization of the priority watch list).
106. Kira Alvarez, Identification of Countries that Deny Adequate Protection,
or Market Access, for Intellectual Property Rights Under Section 182 of the
Trade Act of 1974, at http://www.wifcon.com/newsarctrade0l.htm. (published
May 8, 2001). See also Beam, supra note 80, at 350 (observing that China has
twice been placed on the priority foreign country watch list, each time
resulting in China and the US entering into a bilateral agreement providing
for greater protection of IP rights in China); E. Anthony Wayne, Intellectual
Property Rights Policy ard Enforcement, at http://www.state.gov/
e/eb/rls/rm2002 (Apr. 23, 2002). By leveraging the Special 301, the U.S.
persuaded Slovenia to "pass legislation protecting test data submitted to
obtain marketing approval for pharmaceuticals." Id.
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country identification."'1 07 The watch list identifies countries "that
warrant special attention because they maintain intellectual
property practices or barriers to market access that is of particular
108
concern."
B.

The Ineffectiveness of InternationalPatent Enforcement

Effective enforcement of international patent protection is
crucial not only in developing national economies, but for fostering
research and development of new, life saving pharmaceuticals. 10 9
Thieves of patented goods operate with relative impunity due to
the lax enforcement measures currently in place in the
international market. 110 National enforcement measures are
generally ineffective against infringement.
Remedies are
relatively innocuous and are not expeditiously applied nor
implemented in any meaningful way."' Even member states to
the international treaties, designed to enforce IP rights, often find
excuses for non-compliance or outright disregard for the treaty's
2
provisions, as evidenced by the U.S. Special 301 report."

107. U.S. Department of State, Intellectual Property Rights Protection:
Background Fact Sheet,
at
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/ipr/iprbackground.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003).
108. Id. See also Brendan Daly, USTR Announces Results of December, 2000
Special 301 Out-of-Cycle Reviews, at http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2001/01/011l.html (Jan. 19, 2001). In 2000, the United Arab Emirates ("UAE") received
no listing on the Special 301 list, however, they were identified as a source of
"unauthorized copies of patented pharmaceuticals." Id. The only reason the
UAE was not listed on the Special 301 report was that the UAE gave
assurances that it would reverse any market approvals it had granted
previously. Id.
Also among those listed on the Special 301 Report are
countries that fail to meet the standards required under the TRIPS
Agreement. Id. The list included Argentina, India, Brazil and Vietnam as
countries which are required to provide a minimum level of patent protection
under the TRIPS Agreement, but fail to do so. Id.
109. See Carroll, supra note 3, at 2464-74 (discussing the debate on patent
rights divide between northern and southern countries' views on patent rights
and the positions of developing countries on the enforcement of IP rights). See
also Wegner & Maebius, supra note 72, at 128 (explaining the trend for
businesses to apply only in the US and requesting secrecy of the application
thus allowing a patent holder to maintain a patent while the information is
sealed from the public).
110. Kelly, supra note 82. See also Jennifer Mills, Comment, Alternative
Dispute Resolution in InternationalIntellectual Property Disputes, 11 OHIO ST.
J. ON DisP. RESOL. 227, 229-30 (1996) (discussing the fundamental problems of
international intellectual property disputes).
111. See WIPO, Advisory Committee on the Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights, [hereinafter WIPO Advisory Committee] International AntiCounterfeiting
Coalition,
at
http://www.uneceipr.orgfWIPOEnfRFCresponse.doc (Sept. 2001) (discussing the ineffectiveness
of criminal procedures and penalties of most member states).
112. See Daly, supra note 108 (addressing the reasoning of several countries'
non-compliant status).
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TRIPS and WIPO Enforcement Mechanisms

Both TRIPS and WIPO have received criticism for being too
vague and ambiguous in the area of IP protection. 113 TRIPS
provides for mechanisms of enforcement, but these are not
implemented by member countries.1 1 4 TRIPS fails to specify how
IP disputes are to be decided, 115 nor does the treaty have any
disciplinary powers to deter infringement or to enforce IP rights.1 16
However, TRIPS does specifically address exhaustion of
7
rights and parallel imports in Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement."
Article 6 provides that none of its provisions may apply to parallel
imports or exhaustion of rights." 8 Therefore, even if a member
country is violating a provision of the agreement in any way by
allowing parallel imports, that country may not be disputed
against.119
Also, TRIPS cuts the effectiveness of its enforcement
mechanism by allowing continual extensions of the compliance
period for developing countries.12o As a result, several developing

113. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 84, at 782. See also, Wegner & Maebius,
supra note 72, at 126. (explaining that ambiguities exist within the current
international law of patents, and questioning whether using research tool
patents in biotechnology is a violation of the patent holder's rights); Pechman,
supra note 42, at 193 (discussing the dispute settlement mechanism of
TRIPS); Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 607-12 (discussing the current
attempts at patent law harmonization and the impediment to those attempts);
Mills, supra note 110, at 229-39 (discussing the strengths and weaknesses of
the GATT and WIPO treaties); Shozo Uemura, WIPO Programs and Activities
for the Reduction of Patent Costs, at http://www.law.washington.edu
casrip/SymposiumfNumber5/pub5atcl2O.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2003)
(providing and discussing nine treaties which are among the main
international efforts to harmonize global patent protection).
114. WIPO, Advisory Committee, supra note 111. TRIPS provides for border
measurers to stop the flow of counterfeit goods; however, the provision is
written in a manner that permits member countries "to comply on paper, but
not in practice." Id. at 2. "The vast majority of WTO member states make
border enforcement available through an 'application' process, whereby the
right holder files an application with the competent authorities." Id.
115. Pechman, supra note 42, at 193. See also Sabatelli & Rasser, supra
note 44, at 609-10 (explaining that WIPO focuses too heavily on procedural
issues and not enough on the substantive issues dealing with the right of the
patent holder).
116. Hicks & Holbein, supra note 84, at 782.
117. See TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 6.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at art. 66 (providing least developed nations a 10 year delay in
implementing TRIPS' minimum protections for patent holders). Id. at art. 65,
art. 67 (outlining the grace periods for TRIPS enforcement); TRIPS, supra note
51, at art. 30 (providing developing member states the opportunity to "provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent."); James

Rogan,

Official Outlines U.S. Goals for Global Patent System, at

http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/econ/ipr/ipr-rogan26.htm

(Mar.

26,

2002)
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countries that are signatory states to TRIPS provide little, if any,
patent protection. 121 These extensions provide no real incentive
for developing countries to conform with minimum standards
espoused in TRIPS. 122
The WTO dispute settlement procedures are ineffective. The
WTO has little, if any, power to compel a party to comply with the
panel's findings. 23 The WTO dispute panel prefers that the
member, found to be in violation of GATT, comply with its
provisions. 124 However, if the panel cannot compel the member
country to comply, it will allow the offending country to provide
compensation to the injured party. The offending country is not
required to change the current status of its laws, which remain in
violation of GATT.126 Therefore, it is unlikely that such an
enforcement mechanism, such as the WTO dispute settlement
panels, will actually be effective in enforcing its own provisions.
2. Special 301 is Evidence of the Ineffectiveness of Current
Enforcement Mechanisms
Every year the USTR identifies countries that violate IP
rights internationally. 26 The ineffectiveness of international

enforcement of IP rights is evidenced by the rising number of
27
countries included in the list each year. 1
Among those countries identified as failing to enforce IP
rights, even at the minimum standard of TRIPS, is Argentina. 128
Argentina has a tenuous history for the protection of
pharmaceuticals. 29 Its patent protection for pharmaceuticals has
"steadily deteriorated over the last two years."'130 In fact,
Argentina provides no patent protection for pharmaceuticals even
though it is explicitly required to do so under TRIPS. 31

(explaining that developing countries were given an extra four years to comply
with TRIPS and those that did not comply by 2000 were given another five
years). Least developed countries were given until 2006 and then extended
until 2016 for compliance with TRIPS. Id.
121. Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 613.
122. Pechman, supra note 42, at 195.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 205.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 196 (explaining the history of the Special 301).
127. See Daly, supra note 108.
128. Id. Other countries which are identified as having sub-standard patent
protection for pharmaceuticals are India, Israel, Brazil, Qatar and Vietnam.

Id.
129. Daly, supra note 108.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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3. Current Judicial Enforcement Mechanisms Are Too Costly and
Time Consuming
Most of the enforcement mechanisms provided in the
international treaties rely on each member's own judicial system
to enforce the patent holder's rights. 132 These systems have
proven ineffective. 133 It is nearly impossible for patent holders to
prove infringement. 3 4 This is due, in part, to a lack of meaningful
discovery in patent infringement cases. 35 It is virtually impossible
for a patent holder to discover how its patented research tools and
36
products are being used and then prove this to a court.
Assuming that the act of infringement could be proven to a
court's satisfaction, getting to that initial point is too costly for
most patent holders. 137 Enforcing patent rights is often too time
consuming for all but the most profitable patent holders. 38 Even
the TRIPS panel process can take thirty-three to thirty-seven
1 39
months, not including the appeals process.
The current mechanisms to enforce the minimum standards
of TRIPS on a signatory member are inadequate along with the
current framework for the enforcement of international IP rights.
Without enforcement, countries will have to harmonize and
strengthen IP rights of their citizens, otherwise research efforts
will prove worthless.
III. REVISING CURRENT ENFORCEMENT MEASURES
There is a universal need for patent protection; however,
getting all concerned parties to agree on how to protect those
rights is difficult. As patent grants become exceedingly more
important, WIPO and TRIPS must take leadership action to
ensure that progress does not stall. This can be accomplished by
making some strong, yet simple, revisions to the current patent
enforcement system. However, for patent enforcement to truly be
effective, an independent patent tribunal should be created.
In order to make strong patent enforcement become a reality,
132. For GATT, see Mills, supra note 110, at 234. When an individual patent
holder has a dispute with a foreign nation that patent holder is forced to deal
with a foreign legal system which often times is confusing since it involves
complex issues as to the choice of law involved, whether equitable remedies
are available and what damages are available. Id. at 237.
133. Id.
134. Wegner & Maebius, supra note 72, at 126.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 129.
138. Id.
139. See WTO, The Panel Process Flow Chart, at http://www.wto.org/
englishlthewtoe/whatis e/tife/disp2_e.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2003)
(depicting the panel process from beginning to end and the time each step
takes to complete).
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a few changes need to be made. 140 First, the interpretations that
the Doha Declaration provides should be more narrowly tailored to
ensure that incentives remain to develop life saving drugs.
Second, compulsory licenses should be more narrowly construed
and their use limited. Third, TRIPS needs to become a more
effective treaty by enforcing the rights of patent holders itself,
instead of leaving it up to member countries. Fourth, an agency of
WIPO should be created to enforce patent holder's rights. Further,
those countries that do provide adequate patent protection should
crackdown on patent infringers. Finally, developing countries
should not be given such lengthy time extensions for compliance
with TRIPS.
A. The Doha Declaration
1.

A Response

The Declaration opens the door wider for countries to use
compulsory licensing, placing pharmaceutical companies on notice
that, if they undertake research and development of drugs for
tropical diseases, those most likely to be deemed national
emergencies, they risk losing any potential profit from a successful
drug. Therefore, compulsory licensing may actually negate any
preexisting incentive to develop these drugs.14'
The interpretations that the Declaration provides should be
more narrowly tailored.
For example, the term "national
emergency" should be defined using factors such as the percentage
of the population affected, how easily the disease can spread, and
the severity of the symptoms. A respected organization, such as
the World Health Organization ("WHO"), should be consulted to
determine when a national health emergency exists. 42 This would
allow an independent body to make the decision on previously
determined grounds, resulting in a more fair, unbiased decision.
Furthermore, adequate compensation for a compulsory license
should take into account the research and development that was
required to produce that drug. 143 After all, this is the primary
concern when developing a pharmaceutical, and the main cost that
must be recovered. The country should not have to pay full
compensation, but the research and development costs should at
least be considered.
Additionally, Article 31, which requires a product to be used
140. See Edward Fiorito, Highlights of Selected Recommendations of the
Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, 1 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 11, 18
(1992)
(discussing advisory commission on patent law reform's
recommendation for patent enforcement and patent harmonization).
141. Id. at 66.
142. Murthy, supra note 57, at 1341.
143. Sykes, supra note 63, at 68.
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predominantly for the domestic market, should be changed to
mandate the entire production be used for addressing the national
emergency within the domestic market only.
Compulsory
licensing should be limited in scope in order to provide a balance
144
between patent rights and public health.
Governments might be more successful if they cease the use
or threat of compulsory licensing and, instead, offer protections to
patent holders in exchange for discounted drugs to be used for
their poorest citizens. 145 Governments can offer to impede the sale
of these discounted drugs to their wealthier citizens. 146 These
governmental measures would provide the patent holder with at
least minimal protection while, at the same time, affording the
citizens of that country access to essential medicines.
2. Doha Interpretation
As evidenced, compulsory licenses are appropriate under
certain circumstances, however, it must be kept in mind that these
are exceptions, not the norm. 147 Therefore, when the TRIPS
Council considers how to address the issue of countries without
domestic production capabilities, many factors should be kept in
mind: "infrastructure, financing, elimination of impediments such
as tariffs and internal taxes and training."'148 Also, in order to
protect the IP rights of patent holders, which TRIPS was designed
1 49
to do, the licenses should be limited and carefully drawn.
Before a compulsory license for manufacture of a product in a
foreign market should be used, a government should still try to
obtain the pharmaceutical from the patent holder. If sufficient
quantities at a price comparable to that obtainable under a
compulsory license can be obtained from the patent holder, the
compulsory license should not be used.
More information for an effective solution would be helpful. A
study should be conducted to determine exactly the global
situation with respect to diseases plaguing the developing
countries as well as what pharmaceuticals would be needed to
combat those diseases. It should be determined which of those
pharmaceuticals are patented and which can not be afforded by
the citizens of those countries requiring assistance. This would
allow everyone to see what effect patents have on access to
pharmaceuticals and which ones must be addressed by the

144. Murthy, supra note 57, at 1342-46.
145. Sykes, supra note 63, at 67-68.
146. Id.
147. "Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public
Health,"
available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/sectors/doha-tripsgraph6.PDF (last visited May 20, 2003).
148. Id.
149. Id.
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Council.
If countries lacking the manufacturing facilities to produce
pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license are permitted to seek
foreign manufacture, then the TRIPS Council should monitor the
use of the license in each case as well as the results achieved. 150
Therefore, there should be a reporting requirement for the country
to provide necessary information to the Council regarding the
nature of the national emergency, the pharmaceutical subject to
the compulsory license, where the drug is manufactured, in what
quantities and whether there is any evidence that the drugs are
not reaching the domestic market.151
The entire output of the manufacturing facility should be
required for domestic use only in the country that has the
compulsory license. 15 2 The drug should be exported to and used
solely by the member in need. Furthermore, the member with the
compulsory license should ensure this is executed without any of
the product shipped to another country.
These measures would ensure that countries lacking the
manufacturing capability can still obtain the pharmaceuticals
necessary during a national emergency while also limiting its
scope and protecting the patent holder. Such limitations would
balance the right to access necessary medications and the right of
the patent holder.
B. CounteractingInfringement Methods
1.

DifferentialPricing

Differential pricing would allow the patent holder to sell
pharmaceuticals in every country at an affordable price. The
wealthier countries pay more, allowing the patent holder to
recover the research and development costs of that drug where it
can be afforded. The poorer countries pay what they can in order
to cover the marginal costs of manufacturing the drug plus a very
minimal profit. The patent holder would at least recoup some
profit. 153 However, for this to work, there must be a collective
action among developing countries to protect the patent holder
from parallel imports.
2. Exhaustion of Rights
Although amendments to TRIPS are difficult to execute, it
benefits both developing and developed countries when the rights

150. Id.

151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Sykes, supra note 63, at 64.
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of a patent holder are not exhausted after the first sale.154 Patent
holders should be given the right and the power to fight patent
infringement throughout the world. The income pharmaceutical
companies potentially lose through compulsory licensing may be
less prevalent if other forms of patent infringement could be
stopped or deterred.
C. Stronger Patent Protection
The long history of little, if any, patent protection in the
developing and under developed countries has discouraged
pharmaceutical companies from developing drugs to be marketed
in those areas. If developing countries strengthen IP protection
within their borders, the pharmaceutical companies have a greater
incentive to willingly enter those markets.
Although the market in developing countries seems minimal
compared to the world market, stronger patent protection may be
the necessary incentive necessary to the development and low
pricing of drugs in those countries.
Drugs that treat serious and widespread conditions are precisely the
drugs that are the most valuable to society, and thus the types of
drugs on which more research and development has the greatest
potential payoff. A policy that requires the developers of such drugs
to sacrifice their intellectual property rents in the name of a
'national emergency' or some similar moniker will simply discourage
research in the areas where it has the most potential to yield high
returns. 155
In one study, a survey conducted in a range of industries
sought to determine what percentage of inventions would not have
been developed if not for IP protection. 156 The empirical data
showed that for most industries, fourteen percent of the products
would not have been developed. 157 However, the response for the
58
pharmaceutical industry was sixty percent.
D. Changes are Needed to Make TRIPS More Effective
Currently, the enforcement of IP rights under TRIPS is weak
because TRIPS does not clearly define the settlement of patent
right disputes. 59 Instead, TRIPS leaves it to the signatory
154. Id. at 67.
155. Id. at 62.
156. Id. at 60-61.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Pechman, supra note 42, at 193. See also, Mills, supra note 110, at 234.
GATT also does not have an established court system to settle disputes and
instead disputes are often settled with panel discussions. Id. Once the panel
reaches a decision it recommends that the member nation conform to the
panel's decision, however, these decisions are not binding on a member nation.
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countries to determine enforcement of the minimum treaty
standards. 160
However, TRIPS establishes that the treaty's
purpose is to enforce property rights of patent holders in order to
prevent any restrait or adverse affects on international trade or on
61
the transfer of technology.1
In order to fulfill that goal, TRIPS needs to implement an
effective method to enforce the property rights of patent holders

internationally. 162
TRIPS has several provisions calling for fair enforcement
procedures without unreasonable delay, however, there is no
mechanism in place to enforce these provisions on the member
nations.163 Therefore, if member countries refuse to comply with
TRIPS, a WIPO agency should have the power to take over the
enforcement of IP rights until that member country is in
compliance.164 Thus, countries that readily sign and agree to
comply with TRIPS and all of its provisions, must be accountable
to the WIPO agency.
Therefore, TRIPS should take over the enforcement of IP
rights until individual nations implement their own effective
systems. Once the member states establish proper enforcement
measures, TRIPS can then allow the countries to enforce their own
IP rights.
E. An Independent Tribunal Should Be Created To Enforce Patent
Id.
160. TRIPS Agreement art. 41, § 1 (providing that members are to ensure
that IP rights under TRIPS are enforced).
161. TRIPS Agreement art. 8, § 2.
162. Claude E. Barfield & Mark A Groombridge, Parallel Trade in the
PharmaceuticalIndustry: Implications for Innovation, Consumer Welfare and
Health Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 185, 188 (1999).
An effective enforcement system for IP rights would prevent parallel imports.
Id. A patent holder should be allowed to prevent the distribution of goods

across borders. Id. See also WIPO, Advisory Committee, supra note 111. One
way to do this is via border enforcement. Id. Currently, TRIPS' border
enforcement measures are not enforced. Id. The patent holder must file an
application with the nation's authorities to use the border enforcement
measure, requiring the patent holder to supply all necessary information. Id.
That means that the patent holder must supply the authorities with all details
of the counterfeit goods including when they will be coming in, how much and
what transportation is being used. Id. Authorities should be allowed to take
the initiative themselves to create truly effective border enforcement. Id.
163. See TRIPS, supra note 51, art. 41, § 2 (calling for fair and equitable
proceeding, and the prevention of unnecessary or costly delay). See also
TRIPS, supra note 51, art. 41, § 1 (requiring the procedures under member
nations' laws which ensure effective action against infringement of IP rights).
164. Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 610. Currently, WIPO "essentially
ratifies the status quo" since articles 21 and 23, which address the
interpretations and enforcement of patent claims, have such broad language
and most of the signatory countries would not need to take action to comply
with it. Id.
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Holder's Rights
In order for TRIPS to take over enforcement of IP rights,
there must be a tribunal to implement a settlement system.
Therefore, there should be an independent court created under
WIPO for the settlement and enforcement of patent disputes. 165
1.

The Settlement of Patent Disputes

There are several aspects of current dispute settlement
procedures in many problematic nations. In fact, a few countries
already acknowledge that their own judiciary is not up to the task
of prosecuting IP crimes. 166
Thailand, the Philippines and
Panama, and especially China, have begun to create specialized
courts to deal with IP crimes. 167 These countries have realized
that their current judiciary needs to provide better enforcement,
169
better trained judges, 168 and fewer delays.
China has taken the creation of a specialized patent tribunal
system very seriously. This is evidenced by the extensive efforts
made to ensure effective enforcement of IP rights. China created a
series of specialized courts to implement the new laws it adopted
to protect IP rights. 70 China realized the need for strong IP
protection in order to participate in the world economy. Therefore,
China has taken a strong stand against patent and all other forms
of IP infringement.
The Intellectual Property Right Tribunal in China has
jurisdiction over the protection of IP rights in order to safeguard
165. Mills, supra note 110, at 235. Currently, WIPO, which is under the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, has few mechanisms for the
enforcement of IP rights. Id. Recently, WIPO has opened an arbitration
center which addresses these issues. Id. The arbitration center allows for
arbitration, mediation and even expedited forms of arbitration and mediation.
Id. A party can start with mediation, which is non binding, and, under the
expedited form, if a dispute is not settled within a certain time frame, the
dispute will automatically be directed to an expedited arbitration, which is
binding. Id. at 235-36. However, WIPO has no real means in which to enforce
these binding results. Id. at 237.
166. Peter Fowler, Intellectual Property and the Global Marketplace: A Panel
Discussion, at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/ites/0598/ijee/ippanel.htm (last
visited Jan. 29, 2003).
167. Id.
168. Mills, supra note 110, at 231. The lack of experience for a judge on a
patent case causes delay as well as inconsistent results. Id. Therefore, having
judges that already have the necessary technical expertise would speed up the
process and provide more consistent, educated results. Id.
169. Id.
170. See "The organization, functions and powers of the People's courts,"
available at http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/courts/courtl.htm
(last
visited Apr. 28, 2003) (describing China's court system). See also, Naigen
Zhang, Intellectual Property Law in China: Basic Policy and New
Developments, 4 ANN. SURV. IT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4 (1997) (describing Chinese

patent law in detail).
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the rights of patent holders and "to guarantee a party to fully
expect the right of action."'17 1 The IP Tribunal has appellate
jurisdiction from the People's Courts. Among other issues, the
Court may hear patent infringement cases that, though not
172
crimes, potentially may harm the patent owner.
73
China's legal remedies under its patent law are extensive.
The parties are first encouraged to settle the matter on their own.
However, where they cannot agree, the parties may institute legal
proceedings in the People's Court or they can request that the
China Patent Office handle the matter. 74 If those authorities find
the claim to be well founded, it may order the infringer to
not satisfied, the
immediately stop. 75 If the patent holder is 176
Court.
People's
the
to
action
an
bring
can
holder
Chinese law recognizes the need for quick action. When a
request is made to stop patent infringement, if the patent holder is
likely to be harmed, the Court issues a ruling within forty-eight
hours. 177 The Court offers remedies that provide the patent holder
with real recourse for patent infringement. 178 China requires that
illegal income from patent infringement be confiscated. 79 The
infringing party may also be fined up to three times the amount 8of0°
the illegal income along with a fine of up to 50,000 Renminbi.
The infringer may also be prosecuted where the infringement
Additionally, calculated damages are
constitutes a crime.' 8'
recoverable, which include the losses suffered by the patent holder
82
in addition to the infringer's profits.
An international dispute resolution process should take its
cue from China, and other countries, to eliminate the excessive
costs, undue delay and lack of knowledge currently plaguing the
judicial systems of some countries. 8 3 Several ways to combat the

171. "Judicial Protection of IPR in China," available at http://www.
chinaiprlaw.com/english/courts/sichuan.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2004).
172. Id.

available at
173. "Chapter 7: Protection of Patent Right,"
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws4.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2003).
174. Id. See also, Zhang, supra note 170, at 4 (explaining that the Chinese
Patent Office has the ability to settle disputes before they reach the court
system, and also has the power to issue orders for the cessation of patent
infringement).
175. "Chapter 7: Protection of Patent Right," supra note 173.
176. Id.
available at http://www.
IPR Protection,"
to
Fortify
177. "Bid
chinaiprlaw.com/english.laws/laws9.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2003).
177 "Chapter 7: Protection of Patent Right," supra note 173.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Pechman, supra note 42, at 182-83.
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excessive delays exist.184 A firm trial date, as well as strict
deadlines for each stage of the trial, must be set early in the
proceeding. 8 5
An overall maximum time limit for a case
86
settlement must also be established.
2.

A Specialized InternationalIntellectual Property Tribunal

This Comment proposes -that a specialized international
intellectual property tribunal should be created in order to combat
IP infringement worldwide. A specialized tribunal, if effective,
would allow patent holders to efficiently defend their rights and
hold patent infringers responsible for pirating acts.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") is an example of an
effective independent international court. The U.N. established
the ICC in 1998 to prosecute crimes against humanity such as
genocide. 8 7 The International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the arena
for prosecuting international crimes, had no criminal jurisdiction
for prosecuting individuals. 8 8 The ICC, put into force in 2002, is
currently not hearing cases until the Court is fully established and
operational. 8 9 Though created under the direction of the U.N., the
ICC operates independently of the U.N.190
A primary purpose behind creating the ICC was to allow
prosecutions against individuals. 19' As it was, the International
Court of Justice at The Hague was capable of only handling cases
among states, not among individuals. 192 As a result, many states
refused to prosecute its own citizens and crimes went unpunished.
Similarly, the current system for international patent
disputes is only capable of handling disputes among states, not
individuals. This carries the same result, individual states refuse
to prosecute their own citizens and crimes go unpunished. Patent
infringers should be brought to justice by the national court
system, however, these nations are often unwilling or unable to
act.193
As stated earlier, many states benefit from patent
184. Id. at 183. The current dispute settlement procedures under WIPO are
unnecessarily long and arduous, creating a complex and lengthy process. Id.
185. Fiorito, supra note 140, at 18.
186. See Pechman, supra note 42, at 196 (discussing that Congress has set
such deadlines requiring that disputes be settled within eighteen months even
if a settlement is underway).
187. "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/99_corr/estatute.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2003).
188. International
Criminal
Court,
at
http://www.icccpi.int/php/show.php?id=history (last visited May 10, 2003).
189. Id. 4.
190. Id. 9.
191. Article I of the "Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,"
supra note 187 (last visited Apr. 28, 2003).
192. Id.
193. Pechman, supra note 42, at 182.
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infringement and may not gain any benefit from enforcing the
rights of patent holders against pirates living within the state's
borders.
F.

The Need for Stronger NationalEnforcement Against Patent
Infringement

There is an urgent need for those countries with proper IP
enforcement to fully implement those procedures against patent
infringement. Strong civil or criminal penalties are ineffective
94
deterrents for career IP criminals.1
Often unconvicted patent infringers are allowed to retain the
counterfeited goods. 195 These goods are placed back in the
international market and the crime continues. 196 Conversely,
counterfeit goods should immediately be destroyed, whether or not
the defendant is convicted. 197 This prevents counterfeited goods
from reentering the marketplace and benefits both the public and
198
the patent holder.
Those defendants convicted of patent infringement should
lose their business license in that country as well as their licenses
for importing and exporting goods. 199 A civil fine is often not
enough to punish a patent infringer who makes a substantial
profit. Therefore, a more effective way to deter patent
infringement is to focus on preventing that patent infringer from
200
continuing to commit IP crimes.
G. Developing CountriesShould Be Required to Conform to
TRIPS
The TRIPS articles allowing extensive compliance delays for
developing countries must be limited. 20 ' Though understandable
that developing countries need extended time to bring their
systems up to TRIPS standards, 20 2 granting such extensive delays

194. WIPO, Advisory Committee, supra note 111.
TRIPS requires the mental state of willfulness in order for a
195. Id.
defendant charged with patent infringing to be convicted, therefore, the goods
may in fact be counterfeit even though the defendant may not be convicted.

Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 65 (allowing a developing country to
delay compliance for four years after application to WTO agreement); see also,
TRIPS, supra note 51, at art. 66, § 1 (providing for a ten year compliance delay
for least developed countries).
202. Mills, supra note 110, at 232-33. Generally, developed nations provide
higher safeguards for patent protection than do developing nations. Id.
Therefore, more time is needed for the developing nations to bring their patent
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hinders patent holder's rights, constricts international trade, and
hampers the development of the country itself.203 Such extensions
should only be provided in exchange for firm timetables of
204
compliance, as well as periodic progress reports.
Developing countries need incentives to bring their patent
enforcement systems up to TRIPS standards. Economic aid helps
a country develop its own economy to a point where the protection
of IP rights is beneficial. 20 5 The economic aid should not only focus
on developing the country's economy, but also on cutting the cost
of developing its IP system as well. 206 Finally, economic aid also
helps to curtail the increased cost of goods that inevitably results
20 7
from the granting of patents.
Furthermore, developing countries need training to assist in
the transition and implementation of TRIPS. 208
Training
programs should advise developing countries on the best way to
implement as well as enforce a new IP system. 209 All of these
provisions encourage developing countries to bring IP systems up
to TRIPS standards, benefiting patent holders as well as the
developing country itself.
IV. THE FOUNDATION HAS BEEN LAID

A harmonized enforcement system for IP rights benefits all.
It provides more certainty for patent holders as well as security for
It helps to limit the amount of piracy
foreign investment.
occurring worldwide, which helps reduce the price of patented
210
goods as well as the cost of the patent system itself.
A few modifications to the current IP enforcement system will
have a potent affect in helping patent holders enforce their rights.
The foundation for a harmonized patent system has been laid with
the WTO, the U.N., WIPO and TRIPS. We ought to build upon
that foundation, further the development of an international IP

systems up to TRIPS standards. Id.
203. Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 616-17. See also Pechman, supra
note 42, at 193 (explaining that concessions granted to developing countries
may hinder efforts of the implementation of TRIPS standards in those
countries).
204. Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 44, at 617.
205. Kirchanski, supra note 79, at 600.
206. Id. The patent systems in developing countries would be relatively
inexpensive since most developing countries currently do not protect IP rights.
Id.
Therefore, a developing country which brought itself up to TRIPS
standards would likely have few patents to begin with. Id.
207. Id.
208. WIPO, Advisory Committee, supra note 111.
209. Id.
210. Sergio Amenabar & Gustavo Leonardos, WIPO PATENT AGENDA
REQUEST FOR COMMENTS, at http://patentagenda.wipo.int/rfc/rfcl/0023.html
(Feb. 15, 2002).
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system, and ensure the rights of patent holders. While there are
no executed plans, good materials coupled with strong construction
211
methods are the salient tools to ensure success.

211. Rogan, supra note 120,

38.

